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State and local governments frequently look to flagship cultural projects to improve the city 
image and catalyze tourism but, in the process, often overlook their potential to foster local arts 
development.  To better understand this role, the article examines if and how cultural institutions 
in Los Angeles and San Francisco attract and support arts-related activity.  The analysis reveals 
that cultural flagships have mixed success in generating arts-based development and that their 
ability may be improved through attention to the local context, facility and institutional 
characteristics, and the approach of the sponsoring agencies.  Such knowledge is useful for 
planners to enhance their revitalization efforts, particularly as the economic development 

























 Over the last three decades, state and local governments have been increasingly drawn to 
arts and cultural activities as a means of urban revitalization.  A now common strategy is the 
development and promotion of flagship cultural projects.  These high-profile, multi-use, and 
often large-scale arts facilities are typically designed by world-renowned architects and endorsed 
as among a city’s most spectacular attractions.  Governments around the world have invested in 
these projects believing that their presence will enhance the city image and ignite a catalytic 
process that boosts tourism and localized commercial activity.  Such efforts have accelerated in 
the decade following the widely publicized success of the Frank Gehry-designed Guggenheim 
Museum Bilbao in jumpstarting urban redevelopment in the former port city in northern Spain.1    
 Most research on flagship cultural projects has attempted to explain their re-emergence in 
contemporary urban redevelopment strategies and focused on their effect on the city image and 
tourist economy (Evans, 2003; Gomez, 1998; Hamnett and Shoval, 2003; Kong, 2007; Plaza, 
2006; Rodriguez, 2001; Strom, 1999, 2002; van Aalst and Boogaarts, 2002).  While the literature 
explains many of the potentials and problems associated with flagship cultural development, 
much less is known about that which distinguishes cultural flagships from other flagship 
projects-- their role in local arts development.  Similarly, with the emphasis on tourism and 
image, the details of this potentially significant function are often neglected by municipal 
authorities in the planning process.   
 With their high-profile building and location, cultural flagships may not only attract 
tourists, but also function as a catalyst for arts-related activity, ranging from galleries and other 
arts-oriented businesses to artist studios.  In addition to the physical and economic development 
implications of this clustering dynamic, cultural flagships may serve as a support center for local 
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artists and arts organizations by providing a space to meet and exchange ideas, creating 
opportunities for career growth through programs and exhibitions, and partnering with local 
nonprofit, community, and commercial arts organizations.  A growing body of literature 
emphasizes that such support is crucial to attract and retain artists, who offer positive 
contributions to local and regional economies (Currid, 2007; Jackson, 2003; Markusen and 
Schrock, 2006).  Alternatively, cultural flagships may negatively affect local arts development 
and exacerbate the already uneven distribution of resources to cultural producers by pricing out 
that which does not cater to a mainstream, tourist audience-- typically smaller and lower budget 
artistic activity (Evans, 2003; M Miles, 2005).  Do flagship cultural projects catalyze and support 
arts development in their vicinity?  What conditions are necessary and how can planners 
facilitate their capacity to do so?  
 This article addresses these questions through an analysis of flagship cultural institutions 
located in central city redevelopment areas of Los Angeles and San Francisco.  Each case study 
describes and analyzes the ability of the institutions to attract commercial and nonprofit arts 
activity to the surrounding area and their relationship with local artists and arts organizations.  
The findings indicate that the flagship cultural projects have mixed success in generating arts-
based revitalization.  This ability is found to be influenced by four primary factors: attributes of 
the local context, facility characteristics, the needs and priorities of the cultural institution itself, 
and the level of involvement and financing strategies of the redevelopment agencies.  In 
highlighting these issues, the article seeks to establish a more informed role for public agencies 
in the planning and development of current and future flagship cultural projects. 
 
Flagship Cultural Projects and Urban Redevelopment  
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 Flagship cultural projects are a subset of a broader category of flagship buildings ranging 
from sports stadiums and convention centers to libraries that are intended to improve the city 
image and “play an influential and catalytic role in urban regeneration” (Bianchini et al., 1992, p. 
245; Smyth, 1995).  As Attoe and Longa (1989) describe, this catalytic process is one in which a 
building initiates and sustains a chain reaction of incremental activity in the surrounding area 
(also see Sternberg, 2002).  Given that arts and cultural activity is associated with the production 
and consumption of highly symbolic content (Scott, 2004; Zukin, 1995), flagship development 
often relies on museums and other cultural institutions.  Further, with their signature architecture, 
stores, cafés, and merchandising, mainstream cultural institutions have positioned themselves as 
appealing development catalysts for governments seeking to make their urban core more 
attractive and profitable (Hamnett and Shoval, 2003; Strom, 2002; van Aalst and Boogaarts, 
2002). 
 Much of the research on flagship museums and other cultural projects, therefore, has 
concentrated on their role in altering place images (De Frantz, 2005; Evans, 2003; Kong, 2007; 
Lee, 2006; S. Miles, 2005) or on their ability to boost the local tourist economy (Plaza, 2000, 
2006; Sternberg, 2002; Strom, 1999).  On these terms, however, much of the work offers a 
negative assessment, claiming that few cities achieve their quest for global city status through 
spectacular, attention-grabbing cultural projects (Evans, 2003) and that economic and physical 
revitalization come only at the cost of social exclusion and displacement (Rodriguez et al., 2001; 
Vicario and Martinez Monje, 2003) or a loss of local identity (McNeil, 2000; McCarthy, 2005).   
 With the focus on image and tourism, the literature has given much less attention to the 
roles that cultural flagships play in local arts development.  Given their catalytic potential, 
flagship cultural institutions may attract physical development related to the production and 
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consumption of art (e.g. commercial galleries or the rehabilitation of vacant buildings for arts-
related uses).  Additionally, they have the capacity to catalyze arts development by supporting 
local arts communities directly (e.g. exhibit local work or programs directed at local artists).  In 
this vein, Lorente (2002) argues that flagship museums function as catalysts for arts-led 
revitalization by creating an environment that is attractive to artists and other cultural producers.  
He points to the Tate Gallery in Liverpool as the impetus for artists to establish studios in the 
dilapidated warehouses nearby and the Guggenheim Bilbao as a case in which new artist-run 
spaces emerged and thrived with the growth in cultural tourists.2  In essence, because cultural 
flagships are the most visible and well-funded cultural institutions in a city, they may be 
perceived as natural anchors for a strong local arts scene (Grodach and Loukaitou-Sideris, 2007).   
In contrast, Evans (2003) and M Miles (2005) argue that flagship cultural projects often 
do not generate new arts and cultural activity or that, when they do, they actually have a negative 
effect on local cultural production.  Because new development tends to be higher-end, it lifts up 
rents and consequently destroys established arts clusters as artists and smaller arts organizations 
seek more affordable space elsewhere.  Moreover, flagship institutions may assume a 
disconnected stance toward local artists, particularly those that pursue experimental or 
politically-charged work, as they focus on their global competition and depend on blockbuster 
shows that attract large audiences.  In the process, cultural flagships may actually divert financial 
aid from programs geared toward local artistic support (Bianchini, 1993; Strom, 1999). 
 In short, as with image and tourism, the ability of flagship cultural projects to positively 
impact local arts and economic development is contested.  Still, the vast majority of work 
focuses on European examples, particularly the arguably unique case of the Guggenheim Bilbao. 
More work in varied places is needed to better understand how flagship cultural institutions may 
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foster local arts development, what affects this function, and how it may be enhanced.  Such 
knowledge is useful for planners to optimize their revitalization efforts and balance the economic 
and arts development roles of flagship cultural projects.   
Research Approach  
This article uses case study research to examine the ability of flagship cultural projects to 
catalyze and support local arts development and seeks to identify factors that influence this 
ability.  Each case focuses on a pair of cultural institutions located in central city redevelopment 
areas-- the Museum of Contemporary Art (MOCA) and its sister facility, the Temporary 
Contemporary in Los Angeles and the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art (SFMOMA) and 
the Yerba Buena Center for the Arts (YBCA) in San Francisco, California.  These institutions 
were selected because they contain many features common to flagship cultural projects.  Their 
facilities were designed by acclaimed architects where they exhibit modern and contemporary art 
and house various commercial and communal activities such as stores, cafés, or meeting spaces.  
All projects were enabled through significant support from the city redevelopment agency, with 
the exception of the Temporary Contemporary, to improve the area image, catalyze arts-related 
commercial development and attract visitors.  In addition, since each cultural institution has been 
in existence for over ten years, they allow a significant period of time over which to conduct a 
comparative evaluation and, while they remain significant cultural tourist attractions, are no 
longer hailed as the must-see destinations they were in their initial years.  As such, they offer 
instructive and realistic examples of the flagship cultural strategy for many cities.  Finally, 
despite their location in California, the cases are set in two very different urban environments 
and thus offer a useful contrast to European examples such as the Tate Galleries and 
Guggenheim Bilbao.   
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 The case study analyses are derived from interviews, site observation, and documentary 
sources (e.g. disposition and development agreements, redevelopment project plans, cultural 
institution annual reports and visitor surveys, and news articles).  Interviews were conducted 
with current and former directors and staff of the redevelopment agencies and cultural 
institutions as well as representatives of community groups, art organizations, galleries, and 
artists located in the surrounding areas.  The purpose of the interviews was to gain insight into 
the redevelopment process and the perceived relationship between the cultural flagships and 
local arts development from various informed points of view.  Additionally, because 
significantly more art spaces surround YBCA and SFMOMA than MOCA, a four question 
survey was distributed by email to 20 art organizations in their immediate vicinity to better 
understand their location decisions.3  To identify existing art spaces, an inventory and map was 
created of all public, private, and nonprofit visual and performing arts spaces within one mile 
square mile of the flagship projects.4 
 Each case first lays out the project characteristics, goals, and planning process behind the 
flagship projects.  Second, the studies focus on the role of the cultural flagships in generating arts 
activity in the immediate area and their relationship with smaller local arts organizations and 
artists.  Finally, the analysis identifies the factors that influence their catalytic ability and 
engagement in local arts development.  A drawback to this study is the difficulty in precisely 
distinguishing and measuring the impact of the cultural flagships on arts development.  While 
this is common to all redevelopment project evaluations, it is particularly the case with the arts in 
which, for example, the impact of a solo exhibition on an artist’s career, is difficult to precisely 
measure.  Another difficulty is in making generalizations from only two cases studies.  Given 
this shortcoming, I do not attempt to make general propositions that universally guide the 
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outcomes of flagship cultural development.  Nonetheless, because the cases contain many 
commonalities to flagship cultural development, the detailed focus of the case study approach 
does help to further our understanding of this redevelopment strategy and, therefore, provides 
important lessons for planners seeking to develop or redevelop flagship cultural projects.   
MOCA and the Temporary Contemporary 
Project Background 
MOCA, which opened in 1986, anchors California Plaza, an 11.3 acre complex of office, 
hotel, and residential towers located within Los Angeles’ oldest and largest redevelopment area, 
Bunker Hill (Fig. 1).  The 100,000 square foot, $23 million museum building was designed by 
Arata Isozaki and funded through the Community Redevelopment Agency’s (CRA) public art 
fund.  The CRA sought a high-profile museum containing “a world-renowned collection of 
modern art” in a “showcase structure” to transform the image of Bunker Hill-- long known as an  
insulated urban renewal-era office complex (Davis, 1990; Loukaitou-Sideris and Sansbury, 
1995/96)-- to more of an urban center and, thereby attract visitors and art and tourism-related 
services to the area (Community Redevelopment Agency, 1979, p. 5; Cosgrove, 2005, 
interview).  As one prominent MOCA board member proclaimed, “we want a museum that will 
act as a focal point for a revitalized downtown…I would like to see it further catalyze the 
movement of the center of art downtown, with surrounding galleries and artist’s studios in the 
area” (William Norris in Wilson, 1980, p. H2).  Similarly, the artist advisory council involved in 
MOCA’s planning envisioned the museum as a central forum for the city’s dispersed arts 
community (Berelowitz, 1991).  
 [Figure 1 about here] 
In order to fulfill these goals, redevelopment planners made three stipulations in the 
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California Plaza RFP (Community Redevelopment Agency, 1979).  First, they placed MOCA in 
the center of the project facing onto Grand Avenue with a 6.2 acre park extending behind it.  
Second, they increased the California Plaza percent for art requirement from 1 to 1.5% of the 
total project cost and stipulated that the developer finance the construction of the museum 
building from these funds.  Third, construction would take place in the first phase of the project 
as a hedge against a shifting real estate market. 
CRA also assisted MOCA in opening an interim facility during building construction to 
provide a focus for fundraising and begin exhibition of its collection.  The Temporary 
Contemporary (TC) opened in 1983 in a 55,000 square foot former police car garage designed by 
Frank Gehry at just $1.5 million.to mimic an artist’s warehouse space (Fig. 2).  Although 
initially conceived by the museum board and the CRA as an interim site, the TC’s enormous 
popularity enabled it to become a permanent fixture on the Los Angeles art scene.5   
[Figure 2 about here] 
Such creative initiatives proved crucial as a downturn in demand for office space and the 
bankruptcy of the development firm (Cadillac Fairview) in the early 1980’s further slowed and 
altered the shape of the project.  Originally intended to complement the museum as visitor 
attractions, a 12-screen cineplex and the Bella Lewitzky Dance Gallery were never built nor was 
an office tower planned adjacent to MOCA (Community Redevelopment Agency, 1981).6  
Moreover, with a new project developer (Metropolitan Structures), the amount of open space 
was reduced and divided into discrete and fragmented plazas removed from Grand Avenue. 
Although the CRA secured a place for MOCA at California Plaza, they did not engage in 
and plan for wider issues that would potentially affect the catalytic ability of the flagship project.  
For example, the CRA did not negotiate with Metropolitan Structures when they enforced a set 
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of design restrictions on MOCA that were counter to the flagship concept including a 40 foot 
height limit, sunken main entry, and basement-level café.  Additionally, the CRA did not involve 
affected communities in the planning process.  In particular, although the MOCA board set up 
the Artists Advisory Council to assist in museum design issues, many artists complained that this 
was largely a token effort and that they had little real voice (Berelowitz, 1991; Keating, 2005, 
interview).  Finally, and perhaps most crucially, the CRA did not extend their involvement with 
MOCA beyond building siting and financing despite the fact that MOCA was a new institution 
in an area not recognized as a cultural destination and, as such, like most fledgling museums 
would likely struggle in its early years.7 
MOCA’s Influence on the Arts Geography of Downtown Los Angeles 
As the first and largest museum of contemporary art in Los Angeles, MOCA has without 
doubt played a role in drawing attention to the city as a destination for the arts.  Nonetheless, the 
museum has had difficulty generating interest specifically in downtown or even Bunker Hill as 
an artistic center.  Not only has it been difficult for MOCA to anchor arts-based commercial 
development,8 but also the museum has maintained a largely distant relationship with local art 
communities for much of its existence.   
Prior to MOCA, Bunker Hill contained only the Los Angeles Music Center, a 1960’s-era 
high arts compound (including Disney Concert Hall since 2003).  Nonetheless, as shown in 
Figure 3, although 59 art museums or galleries and 10 performance theaters were located within 
the one mile study area in 2007, little arts-related activity exists in the area immediately 
surrounding MOCA.  MOCA’s presence played a supporting role in bringing the Colburn School 
of Performing Arts to California Plaza.9  Additionally, MOCA’s then director, Richard 
Koshalek, helped revive the stalled Disney Concert Hall building campaign through, among 
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other things, a free, round-the-clock exhibition in 1996-97 that featured various large-scale 
models of Frank Gehry’s designs on MOCA’s plaza (Koshalek, 2005, interview; Murphy, 2005, 
interview; Wiant, 2005, interview).  Furthermore, MOCA brought the Temporary Contemporary 
to life.  Gehry’s internationally renowned warehouse renovation inspired cultural institutions 
from the Dia Art Foundation in New York to the Saatchi Gallery in London to convert older 
buildings and warehouses into art spaces (Newhouse, 1998) and was especially popular with 
local artists upon opening.  For its part, the TC met its goal of heightening interest in the Bunker 
Hill facility, but also its presence helped to attract City funding and site development for the 
Japanese American National Museum and the Union Center for the Arts, both of which 
rehabilitated vacant, historic buildings in adjacent blocks (Cosgrove, 2005, interview; Spivack, 
2005, interview). 
[Figure 3 about here] 
Overall, however, MOCA has done little to attract and sustain a concentration of 
commercial galleries, nonprofit arts venues, and artists within the larger one mile study area.  
Although various arts clusters exist downtown (e.g. Arts District, Chinatown, Gallery Row), they 
do so largely independent of MOCA.  A case in point is the Arts District, which emerged in the 
1970’s on the eastern edge of downtown as artists illegal transformed warehouses into live-work 
spaces.  The announcement of a museum of contemporary art downtown initially generated wide 
attention to the downtown arts scene and, when the Temporary Contemporary opened adjacent to 
the Arts District it at first became a de facto flagship museum for local artists as MOCA’s artist 
advisory council intended (Athey, 2004; Friedrich, 2002; Keating, 2005, interview; Spivack, 
2005, interview).  Concurrently, the museum generated broad interest in the area “as a future 
international art center” (McMillan, 1982, p. D3) that, according to the New York Times, “has 
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encouraged a wider range of sophisticated Angelenos to venture downtown” (Slesin, 1984, p. 
C1).  At its peak when the TC opened in the early 1980’s, the Arts District was home to 
anywhere from 1,000 to 5,000 artists and at least two dozen galleries and art spaces (Keating, 
2005, interview; McMillan, 1982; Terry, 1981).  Soon thereafter, many galleries and artists were 
lured out of the area to other artistic hotspots as recession, a rising homeless population, and fear 
of crime made it difficult for them to attract collectors downtown (Keating, 2005, interview; 
Szanto, 2003).  As is the case today, when MOCA opened at California Plaza in 1986, only a 
handful of galleries remained and the majority of artists had already left downtown.   
However, other parts of downtown are experiencing a resurgence of interest from art 
spaces and galleries today.  Based on annual listings compiled by the Downtown News, the 
number located within the downtown increased by 80% (from 30 to 54) between 2002 and 2006 
(Friedrich, 2002; Lion and Hernandez, 2006).  Most of these have opened in Gallery Row which, 
upon gaining official designation by the City in July 2003, has rapidly grown from 3 to 20 
galleries along with numerous art studios and fledging arts-related businesses (Fig. 3).  Gallery 
Row organizers actively market their location near “cultural anchors” such as MOCA and 
Disney Hall to lure prospective galleries, businesses, and clients through activities such as a 
monthly art walk that not only includes MOCA, but is scheduled on the museum’s free 
admission day (Green, 2005, interview).  As a result, Gallery Row has been able to harness the 
power of a large cultural institution to attract as many as 3,000 visitors to the galleries during the 
Art Walk (Hymon, 2006).  However, the identification of the area as Gallery Row, which was 
previously renowned for its abandoned buildings and homeless population is due less to the 
proximity or image power of Disney Hall and MOCA than the efforts of booster artists and art 
galleries, aided by new residential development sprouting in the area, which Gallery Row also 
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works with to lure “creative businesses” into the new ground floor retail spaces (Gallery Row 
Organization, 2006, n.p.).  Still, despite Gallery Row’s success, it is worth noting that while the 
2002 Downtown News list records only 30 galleries, the vast majority of these were at that time 
also relatively new-- 23 (77%) reported opening in the preceding five year period.  As such, as 
occurred in the Arts District, there is a significant likelihood that the current crop of galleries 
may be short-lived and that the simple presence of MOCA and the TC will have little influence 
on their survival. 
 Finally, MOCA’s weak ability to catalyze arts-related development is matched by its 
relationship with the city’s arts community.  Although the museum demonstrated a commitment 
to nurturing smaller commercial and nonprofit arts organizations early on, this role has waned 
over time.  In 1980, Richard Koshalek began his tenure as deputy director by creating the 
“guerrilla museum” with curator Julie Lazar to begin programming before MOCA had a 
building.  To this end, the curators commissioned the display and performance of work in 
downtown’s “underused and overlooked spaces, vacant lots, closed streets, and abandoned 
buildings” (Koshalek, 2005, interview).  This experimental and locally-interactive direction 
continued with the opening of the TC.  Three of four of the first shows featured local work 
commissioned by MOCA, including that which engaged publics beyond the local arts 
community such as an installation piece by a Los Angeles video art group that linked a diverse 
set of the city’s neighborhoods through an early form of video conferencing (Failing, 1983).  
Other exhibitions provided critical commentary on urban issues including redevelopment in 
downtown Los Angeles.  Concurrently, MOCA maintained collaborations with some of the more 
established galleries and experimental art collectives, which provided smaller venues and 
emerging artists more visibility and, in turn, access to new sources of funding.  However, with 
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the opening of the Bunker Hill museum, MOCA increasingly concentrated on maintaining the 
larger facility, building a permanent collection, and putting on major exhibitions, which in turn 
directed attention away from its focus on programs that nurtured the local arts scene (Clark, 
2005, interview; Koshalek, 2005, interview).  In sum, MOCA has struggled to function as a 
catalyst for arts-related activity and serve as an artistic forum as MOCA’s proponents had 
initially envisioned. 
San Francisco Museum of Modern Art and Yerba Buena Center for the Arts 
Project Background 
 YBCA and SFMOMA are located in Yerba Buena Center, an 87 acre redevelopment 
project in the South of Market area.  Opened in 1993 by the San Francisco Redevelopment 
Agency (SFRA), YBCA’s $44 million, 55,000 square foot complex consists of James Polshek’s 
performing arts theater and galleries and a film screening room designed by Fumihiko Maki (Fig. 
4).  Conceived as a kunsthalle with no resident companies or permanent collection, YBCA seeks 
to “present art and entertainment reflecting the San Francisco Bay Area’s diverse cultural 
populations” and provide “a multidisciplinary ‘idea house’ where artists are nurtured, supported, 
exhibited and presented” (Center for the Arts at Yerba Buena Gardens, 1993; Yerba Buena 
Center for the Arts, 2006, n.p.).  Towering over YBCA is the $65 million, 225,000 square foot 
San Francisco Museum of Modern Art designed by Mario Botta (Fig. 5).  The museum, which 
was founded in 1935, moved to YBC in 1995, attracted by a site donated by the SFRA within 
close proximity to Union Square, the city’s center of high-end galleries, shopping, and tourism 
north of Market Street (Bakar, 2005, interview; Lane, 2005, interview).  Once largely defined by 
light industry and SRO housing, the redevelopment area today is better known for the Moscone 
Convention Center, the Yerba Buena Gardens park, and the burgeoning arts district surrounding 
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these flagship cultural institutions. 
 [Figures 4 and 5 about here]  
Both SFMOMA and YBCA were key components of the SFRA strategy to transform the 
larger South of Market area into an arts-based entertainment destination and thereby link it to 
adjacent Union Square (San Francisco Redevelopment Agency, 1979; Sause, 2005, interview).  
This concept first appeared in a 1969 Market Analysis, which suggested that cultural uses could 
attract specialty retail, restaurants, and other nighttime activities while helping to overcome the 
area’s “skid-row image” (Snedcof, 1985).  However, the Agency did not operationalize this 
strategy until 1984 when it offered the initial developer, Olympia and York, land at below 
market value in exchange for contributing the sites and financing for the Gardens and YBCA, 
which were intended to attract visitors and further development, including arts-related activities, 
to the project area (Sause, 2005, interview).   
This delay was due to a long and contentious battle to stop the redevelopment project 
through a series of lawsuits brought by resident and community groups against the SFRA 
(Hartman, 2002). The fight ultimately forced the Agency to place strong emphasis on 
participation in the planning process, which in turn, reinforced the emphasis on the arts not only 
as a development catalyst, but also as a community amenity (Pickering, 2005, interview; Sause, 
2005, interview).  In addition to major project components such as a subterranean convention 
center and the Yerba Buena Gardens, community input gave rise to YBCA, whose mission, 
programming, and technical specifications are largely the product of a committee composed of 
artists and directors of community and alternative art spaces from the city as well as meetings 
with hundreds of local artists organized by the Agency (Cultural Planning Technical Assistance 
Committee, 1983; Pritikin, 2005, interview).     
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In the late 1980’s, with an excess of office space in the city, the tourist economy surging, 
and, in 1993, the bankruptcy of developer Olympia and York, the focus on cultural amenities 
further expanded.  As a result of the bankruptcy, the SFRA was forced to finance the Gardens 
and cultural facilities themselves, which it did largely by exacting support from new 
development projects; rather than continuing to rely on a single entity, the Agency selected 
individual developers on a project by project basis for the remaining sites.  Ultimately, the SFRA 
was able to finance and support a broad range of cultural institutions.  The Agency provided 
substantial funds and key sites toward the establishment of three new institutions-- YBCA, the 
children’s museum Zeum, and the Museum of the African Diaspora (MOAD).  Second, the 
Agency offered incentives to lure museums from other parts of the city.  Like SFMOMA, in the 
early and mid-1990’s, the SFRA provided the Contemporary Jewish Museum and Mexican 
Museum with valuable sites directly across from YBCA as well as generous subsidies.10  Third, 
the Agency stipulated that new residential and office developments provide ground floor space 
for cultural institutions including the California Historical Society (to expand from its existing 
space), the Museum of Craft and Folk Art, and MOAD.  Finally, in addition to this emphasis on 
physical development, the SFRA acknowledged the importance of project management by 
requiring major commercial tenants to contribute to a fund (now totaling approximately $4.8 
million annually) that helps to offset the operation and maintenance costs of YBCA, Zeum, 
MOAD, and Yerba Buena Gardens.  As detailed below, these substantial efforts have been a 
significant factor influencing the catalytic ability of the cultural flagships.  
The Influence of SFMOMA and YBCA on the Arts Geography of Central San Francisco 
Although a majority of the nearly 144 museums or art galleries and 28 performance 
theaters in the one mile study area are located in and around Union Square, the environment 
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fashioned by the Agency and anchored by YBCA and SFMOMA has been a strong magnet for 
arts activity in the redevelopment area as well (Fig. 6).  Today, YBC contains one of the largest 
clusters of nonprofit cultural institutions in the city as well as numerous commercial galleries.  
According to the survey, YBC galleries and cultural institutions including those that did not 
receive Agency assistance, were attracted to YBC for the rent, the type of space available, and 
the overall characteristics of the area, which includes the presence of YBCA and SFMOMA.  A 
majority of local galleries and arts organizations cite the high volume of pedestrian traffic and 
cross-over visitors from SFMOMA and YBCA as a key benefit of their YBC location.  An 
additional advantage, is the close proximity to Union Square at much lower rents and larger 
spaces than exists in the more established gallery nexus.11  In fact, even SFMOMA has directly 
benefited from the YBC location.  Visitor statistics show that upon moving to the area the 
museum saw its attendance more than triple from that at its former home at the Civic Center (San 
Francisco Museum of Modern Art, 2004).  At the same time, however, a significant minority of 
galleries near to the major institutions report that they do not attract clients from SFMOMA or 
YBCA.  They attribute this to a variety of factors ranging from incompatible audiences and 
“visitor fatigue,” to a lack of interaction between the institutions in the district.  Nonetheless, 
each organization surveyed moved to the area only after these flagship institutions opened.   
[Figure 6 about here] 
Therefore, even those galleries that have little to no direct interaction with the larger 
institutions, were at least partly attracted to YBC for the arts-based image of the area, which 
SFMOMA and YBCA have been instrumental in creating.  Besides their sheer physical presence 
and international renown as significant arts destinations their power of attraction is enabled by 
the surrounding built environment.  Many commercial galleries are attracted to a space that 
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connotes “urban” and, like any business wishing to attract clients, one that appears safe and 
clean.  At YBC, this role is fulfilled by the alleys that were not demolished by the Agency’s 
initial work in the 1960’s, which offer comparatively smaller parcels and older buildings.  The 
alley buildings provide not just a lower cost space, but, as one arts organization director put it “a 
pleasing mix of graffiti, poster art and architectural decay” and “a unique pedestrian experience” 
(Whiting, 1996, p. D1).  In other words, the portion of YBC surrounding YBCA and SFMOMA 
retains a safe, urban charm without the undesirable elements that deter higher-end businesses and 
customers.  Conversely, as another gallery owner admits, although the built environment is 
similar, she would not move beyond the western boundary of Yerba Buena Gardens (just one 
block from YBCA and SFMOMA) because she feels clients perceive that area as dirty and 
dangerous (Togonon, 2005, interview).  As such, while SFMOMA and YBCA have helped to 
generate a new cultural district in YBC, their power to attract has not only been dependent on 
substantial Agency investment, but decreases significantly with distance. As is evident in Figure 
6, the vast majority of YBC arts activity is located in the eastern section of the project adjacent to 
YBCA and SFMOMA and in close proximity of Union Square. 
 Furthermore, although YBC offers a lower rent alternative to Union Square, its popularity 
has put the area out of reach for many of the art spaces that first opened in the South of Market 
area.  Prior to YBCA, the Ansel Adams Center (1987) and Crown Point Press (1991) were the 
only art spaces in the redevelopment area.  Following YBCA’s opening, at least 17 galleries 
moved within the immediate vicinity of the major cultural institutions, most of which opened just 
prior to SFMOMA (Baker, 1995; Whiting, 1996).  At least six of these were artist-run galleries 
located on the boundaries of YBC or in the southern portion of the redevelopment area before 
much of the commercial development occurred (Baker, 1995).  However, redevelopment, 
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coupled with the rapid growth of multimedia and technology-related firms in the area sent real 
estate prices skyrocketing and drove arts organizations and artists elsewhere (Solnit and 
Scwartzenberg, 2000).  In 1998, for example, the Adams Center was forced to move to another 
YBC location after a 400% rent increase (Bonetti, 2001).  By 2001, not only was it forced to 
close for good, but all but five of the 17 early galleries, and others, left the area due to rising 
rents.  Similarly, the Cartoon Art Museum moved upon receiving a $42 per square foot rent 
increase (Hamlin, 1999).  Soon after, however, the 2001 stock market crash resulted in a 
considerable decline in rents,12 which enabled the museum to assume the former space of the 
Adams Center.  In addition, since the dot-com bust, at least six commercial galleries have moved 
to YBC, continuing to cluster near YBCA and SFMOMA.   
Finally, although SFMOMA and YBCA have played a lead role in transforming YBC 
into an identifiable cultural district, staff at both institutions admit that they interact little with 
their neighbors and, as a result, do not fully catalyze the potential synergies attributed to cultural 
clusters through, for example, joint exhibitions, shared ticketing and marketing (Frost-Krumpf, 
1998; McCarthy, 2005; Montgomery, 2003; van Aalst and Boogaarts, 2002).  While the lack of 
engagement may be due to the diversity of YBC cultural institutions, even those with much in 
common, like YBCA and SFMOMA, lack a symbiotic relationship.  This situation has clearly 
hurt YBCA more than SFMOMA.  For example, attendance records show that during 
SFMOMA’s first two years of operation at YBC (1995 and 1996), YBCA attendance plunged 
from 234,105 to 144,177 while SFMOMA’s jumped from 460,350 to 688,072 (San Francisco 
Museum of Modern Art, 2004;Yerba Buena Center for the Arts, 2004a).  Lacking opportunities 
to capture cross-over visitors from the more tourist-friendly museum across the street, YBCA 
loses out on a significant revenue source and the opportunity to present to more visitors the work 
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of emerging regional artists. 
 However, whereas SFMOMA is also for the most part disconnected from regional artists 
and art organizations, YBCA excels in its support of these entities.13  Unlike most flagship 
projects that focus on mainstream, high culture exhibitions and popular attractions, YBCA was 
formulated by San Francisco artists to function as a resource for the local arts community to 
display and support local and experimental work.  To this end, the Center regularly features and 
commissions the work of local performance and visual artists and offers its theater and screening 
room at reduced community rental rates.  It also partners with local cultural organizations to 
commission work and conduct artist-in-residence and educational programs including those that 
focus on business aspects of the occupation.  Additionally, YBCA provides a forum to present 
politically-charged work and to discuss important urban issues.  Exhibitions, performances, and 
symposia have focused on issues of homelessness, gentrification, and even redevelopment itself 
(Killacky, 2005, interview; Pritikin, 2005, interview; Smith, 2005, interview).   
Analysis 
The case studies highlight four primary factors influencing the ability of the flagship 
cultural projects to generate arts-based revitalization and artistic support: the local context, 
facility characteristics, the needs and priorities of the institutions, and the involvement and 
financing strategies of the redevelopment agencies formulated in the planning process.  As 
discussed in the conclusion, planners can have a positive influence on these factors.  
Local Context  
The ability of the flagship cultural projects to catalyze arts development is highly 
dependent on the surrounding context.  Project planners must ensure there is space available in 
the project area to meet the needs of the smaller arts organizations and businesses that the 
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flagship is meant to attract and be aware of existing land uses adjacent to the project area.  
Although Yerba Buena Center contains large-scale entertainment facilities and office, hotel, and 
residential towers, the project also offers appropriately sized, open and flexible spaces suitable 
for a variety of art spaces on the alleys surrounding YBCA and SFMOMA.  Simultaneously, 
both nonprofits and commercial galleries take advantage of a location adjacent to the high 
density shopping, art, and tourism at Union Square while enjoying comparatively lower rents.  
YBC is, furthermore, located in a highly accessible location just off the Bay Bridge and served 
by excellent public transportation.  As such, YBC’s strategic location and diverse physical 
environment helped to enable YBCA and SFMOMA to catalyze arts development.   
In contrast, MOCA is physically and perceptually isolated within Bunker Hill’s rather 
homogenous office environment.  The museum’s difficulty in anchoring art-related businesses is 
due in part to the fact that there is literally no space in California Plaza to house such activity.  
As a result of the developer stipulations noted above, most retail and restaurant sites are actually 
at the opposite end of the project from MOCA and virtually none are within direct sight of the 
museum.  This condition is exacerbated by the corporate-focused aesthetics of Bunker Hill, 
which, according to the artists and gallery owners interviewed, are unappealing and unaffordable 
for smaller arts venues.  These characteristics, furthermore, make building connections with the 
other adjacent downtown arts districts more difficult to establish and maintain. 
At the same time, although a sensitively planned environment is important in generating 
arts development, other factors may work against it.  Despite significant redevelopment 
investment, YBCA and SFMOMA have attracted arts development only in their adjacent blocks.  
Further, the commercial success of the project, coupled with the dot-com real estate boom that 
affected all of the South of Market area, has meant that lower budget art spaces have been priced 
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out of the area.  
Facility Characteristics and Institutional Priorities 
 Because a prime characteristic of a flagship cultural project is its iconic quality, the 
buildings are typically designed to be big and flashy.  However, large-scale facilities require a 
major annual investment toward building maintenance and operations, which can deflect funding 
away from programming, education, and outreach as was the case at MOCA.  The museum, for 
example, spends 21% of its $17.95 million annual expenditures on building operations and 
security.  In comparison, it spends only 5% more on curatorial and exhibition-related costs, and 
just 4% of the total goes toward education programs (Museum of Contemporary Art, 2004).  
These financial pressures, along with the associated focus on courting major donors and raising 
an endowment, contributed to MOCA’s abandonment of its role as a nucleus for local artists 
(Clark, 2005, interview; Koshalek, 2005, interview).  As such, the size and cost of the cultural 
facility can influence the level of engagement with local arts communities and the public at large.  
This, in turn, can affect the catalytic impact of the cultural flagship on arts development; by 
alienating the city’s larger arts community, the museum reduced interest in an adjacent location 
and thus its ability to spin-off arts-related development nearby.  As discussed in the following 
section, while the CRA provided MOCA with a building, the lack of a financial safety net for the 
fledgling museum helped to hasten this outcome.  
 Similarly, faced with the reality of financing its immense facility, extensive marketing 
program, and enormous collection (23,861 items according to the museum’s 2004 annual report), 
SFMOMA has had little interaction with local institutions and artists (Ross, 2005, interview).  
Additionally, the museum attributes its lack of involvement with YBC cultural institutions to 
incompatible missions.  Jack Lane, director of SFMOMA during the museum’s relocation, 
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confesses to not pursuing a relationship with YBCA primarily because SFMOMA considered 
itself “a collecting institution on the major international circuit for contemporary art” and YBCA 
“a community resource for performing arts groups and for visual artists who were not finding 
easy access into the big institutions” (Lane, 2005, interview).  In short, SFMOMA does little to 
collaborate or invest in the arts regionally because this does not contribute to the museum’s 
global ambitions.   
 In contrast to these large-scale museums, YBCA, which focuses attention on regional 
artists, is unburdened by a large facility or collection.  As a consequence, it allocates $3 million, 
or 40%, of its annual budget to programming expenses and just $680,000 or 9% of the budget to 
building costs and is, therefore, much better positioned to support arts development both within 
and beyond the project boundaries (Yerba Buena Center for the Arts, 2004b).  
Redevelopment Agency Involvement and Financing Strategies 
 The agency’s goals for the redevelopment area and the approach to financing the cultural 
projects have an affect on the ability of the cultural institution to generate development.  An 
important difference between the two cases-- and a key reason for the SFRA’s greater success in 
meeting its development objectives-- was that agency’s wide-ranging involvement in cultural 
development and its incorporation of the views and expertise of local artists and arts managers in 
the planning process.  The SFRA not only located cultural facilities on key sites and funded their 
construction, but also, in recognition of their importance to the overall project, set up a linkage 
policy to financially assist cultural institutions.  Additionally, the Agency to a large extent 
followed the specifications of local artists in the development of YBCA and, consequently 
created a flagship that both contributes to its economic development objectives and provides a 
forum for Bay Area artists. 
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In contrast, the CRA role consisted of funding the MOCA buildings alone and, although 
the MOCA board-- not the CRA-- created an artist advisory council, their role was initially 
marginal and virtually nonexistent upon the opening of the Bunker Hill facility.  As noted above, 
the lack of ongoing support was particularly detrimental for the Bunker Hill facility because as 
the museum struggled financially, attention was drained from certain programming and outreach 
activities.  As such, the CRA assumption that their responsibility was only to the building prior 
to opening and not post-occupancy was counterproductive to the Agency’s development 
objectives.  In short, if a public entity invests significant money and prime real estate in a 
cultural institution, it is prudent to provide insurance-- e.g. annual or emergency funding for 
maintenance and operations-- so that their investment can realize its full potential as the SFRA 
did at Yerba Buena.  
Conclusion 
 With the focus on image and tourism, planners may not adequately consider the arts 
development potential of flagship cultural projects.  This is a notable omission in light of 
literature that identifies the significant contributions of the arts and artists to local and regional 
economies (Florida, 2002; Markusen and Schrock, 2006).  Drawing on case study research, this 
article examined the capacity of established flagship cultural projects to catalyze and support arts 
development and the factors that affect this ability.  In terms of this analysis, SFMOMA and 
YBCA have been considerably more successful than MOCA.  MOCA’s failure to attract arts-
based development is due to characteristics of its location and the CRA cultural strategy that 
called upon a single building to catalyze development without full consideration of the role that 
programming and community relations play in this process and the institutional pressures 
associated with a new cultural institution.  With a much more extensive investment in arts 
 25 
facilities, community engagement, and a strategic location, the SFRA had greater success in 
meeting its goal of extending higher-end development south of Market Street-- though only at 
the expense of sacrificing many of the lower budget and artist-run institutions that formerly 
thrived in the South of Market area.  As such, far from simply catalyzing arts development 
through their presence alone, the ability of these institutions to attract and support arts activity 
was found to be dependant on attributes of the local context, characteristics of the cultural 
institutions themselves, and the approach of the redevelopment agencies.   
 Planners can engage in each of these issues to improve and expand the catalytic ability of 
flagship cultural projects.  First, both cases demonstrate that cultural flagships must be located in 
areas that can physically support a diversity of smaller-scale arts activity.  The alleys at YBC and 
the close proximity to Union Square enabled galleries and art spaces to move there, while 
developer restrictions and a lack of suitable space in Bunker Hill prohibited such activity near 
MOCA.   
 Second, YBCA’s ability to nurture the local arts community stems not only from its 
mandate, but also its organizational structure and lower overhead allows it more flexibility in 
programming and outreach than the large-scale flagship projects, which are compelled by 
financial and institutional pressure to pursue the most lucrative activities.  Further, MOCA’s 
early commitment to local arts with the TC and the guerrilla museum reinforces this finding and 
demonstrate that flagship architecture does not have to be large-scale or expensive to attract 
international attention.  As such, YBCA and the TC illustrate the benefits of complimenting 
large-scale projects with more artist-centered spaces or the potential for an alternative flagship 
strategy that eschews the large-scale, mainstream facilities altogether.     
 Stemming from this, planners must expand the conceptualization of cultural flagships as 
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tools for generating physical revitalization and consumption and also approach them as assets in 
a region’s larger artistic community and cultural economy.  This is accomplished by more 
directly tapping into their potential to engage local artists and facilitate artistic production.  As 
MOCA’s initial mission and YBCA show, a flagship cultural project has potential to incubate 
local artists and serve as a forum for interaction between artists, arts organizations, and even for-
profit arts, design, and media firms.  In this regard, planners can go beyond simply dedicating 
funds toward upfront building costs by seeking public and private funding for the development 
of exhibitions, symposia, training, and other related activities.  They can better ensure that 
appropriate work space is available nearby for artists and fledgling cultural firms to increase the 
potential for networking and collaboration through rezoning, financial incentives and rent 
regulations, and coordinating with other public agencies to target cultural development in these 
areas.  Expanding the flagship cultural strategy to encompass both cultural consumption and 
production better engages cultural institutions in a wider arts and economic development role 
than the focus on tourism and image alone.  
Notes 
                                                 
1 At the same time, this cultural building boom is an extension of a longer trend rooted in projects such as the 
Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts and the Centre Pompidou in Paris that were intended to catalyze localized 
redevelopment. 
2 However, in the case of the Guggenheim Bilbao, many of these spaces, which feature Basque work and programs 
geared to young artists, only emerged because critics in the local arts community convincingly showed that the 
museum ignored this role (Baniotopoulou, 2001; Guasch, 2005).  In response, rather than ensuring that the 
Guggenheim carried out these functions, state and local government funded numerous smaller, alternative art spaces 
that would (Holo, 1999). 
3 A total of 12 galleries and cultural facilities responded to the survey and the relevant information was gathered 
from the websites of 5 other art organizations. A copy of the survey is available upon request from the author. 
4 Sources included on-line phone directories, contact with the galleries and theaters themselves, websites that 
document and promote the local arts scenes, convention and visitor bureau websites, local business journals, and 
local news weeklies. 
5 Following a $10 million donation to MOCA from media mogul David Geffen, the TC was officially rechristened 
the Geffen Contemporary.  However, I will refer to it as the Temporary Contemporary or the TC, as it is popularly 
known, throughout the rest of the article. 
6 For a more detailed description of the planning process at both California Plaza and Yerba Buena Center see 
Sagalyn, 1997. 
7 Ayahlushim Hammond (2005, interview), former Bunker Hill Project Administrator, states that once the project 
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finished construction, “There isn’t really much for the [CRA] to do.  MOCA is independently managed.”  Similarly, 
Don Spivak (2005, interview) emphasizes that “We’re not in the business of providing operating support for 
activities.  Hopefully, you’d create enough development activity that there will be a market for what goes in there.”  
In terms of location, although the Los Angeles County Music Center was already nearby, Bunker Hill was primarily 
defined by office towers and other corporate uses.   
8 Although the addition of the Frank Gehry-designed Walt Disney Concert Hall to the Music Center in 2003 has 
recently cast fresh attention on the area, this architectural spectacle has yet to alter this condition.   
9 Foremost, however, was the unplanned availability of land that enabled the move.  The site was initially slated by 
the CRA for an office tower but abandoned during the 1980’s recession and subsequent downturn in demand for 
office space (Murphy, 2005, interview; Spivack, 2005, interview; Wiant, 2005, interview).  Colburn and the CRA 
later entered into an agreement for an $80 million expansion of the school that opened in 2008. 
10 However, each experienced difficulty in their own fundraising efforts.  The Jewish Museum finally opened in 
June 2008 and the Mexican Museum has yet to break ground.   
11 For example, when a rent increase forced Braunstein/Quay Gallery to move from their Union Square location in 
1998, they sought out a site at YBC.  The gallery initially paid just $.50 per square foot for their YBC-adjacent 
space (email correspondence with gallery, 15 June, 2005; Togonon, 2005, interview). 
12 According to Grubb and Ellis, during 2001, rents in the entire South of Market area declined roughly 50% to $15 
to $25 per square foot (Hamlin, 2001). 
13 SFMOMA has an off-site venue for local collectors and corporate clients to rent the work of Bay Area artists and 




Athey, R. (2004) We-Ho voices, LA Weekly, 24 November, pp. 23. 
 
Attoe, W. and Longa, D. (1989) American urban architecture: Catalysts in the design of cities. 
(Berkeley, CA, University of California Press). 
 
Baker, K. (1995) Taking Art Into Their Own Hands; Artist-run galleries prove local vitality, San 
Francisco Chronicle, 2 June, pp. C1. 
 
Baniotopoulou, E. (2001) Art for whose sake? Modern art museums and their role in 
transforming societies: The case of the Guggenheim Bilbao. Journal of Conservation and 
Museum Studies, 7, pp. 1-15. 
 
Berelowitz, J.-A. (1991) L.A. stories: Of art, MOCA, and city building, Unpublished Doctoral 
dissertation, University of California Los Angeles, Department of Art History. 
 
Bianchini, F. (1993) Remaking European cities: The role of cultural policies, in: F. Bianchini and 
M. Parkinson (Eds), Cultural policy and urban regeneration: The west European experience, pp. 
21-57 (Manchester, Manchester University Press).   
 
Bianchini, F, Dawson, J and Evans, R. (1992) Flagship projects in urban regeneration, in: P. 
Healy, et. al. (Eds), Rebuilding the city: Property-led urban regeneration, pp. 134-153 (London, 
E&FN Spon). 
 
Bonetti, D. (2001) Ansel Adams Center to Shut Its Doors; Nonprofit will sell 140 of his prints, 
San Francisco Chronicle, 18 October, pp. B1. 
 
Center for the Arts at Yerba Buena Gardens. (1993) In Out of the Cold: inaugural exhibition 
presented by CITIBANK, San Francisco: The Center. 
 
Community Redevelopment Agency of Los Angeles. (1979) Development offering: Remaining 
8.75 acres of Bunker Hill.  
 
_______. (1981) Report on the proposed disposition and development agreement for the lease 
and purchase of parcels R, S, T, U, & Y-1: Bunker Hill urban renewal project. 
 
Cultural Planning Technical Assistance Committee. (1983) Recommendations regarding the 
Yerba Buena Gardens cultural facilities. 
 
Currid, Elizabeth (2007) How Art and Culture Happen in New York, Journal of the American 
Planning Association, 73(4), pp. 454-467 
 
Davis, M. (1990) City of Quartz. (New York, Vintage). 
 
De Frantz, M. (2005) From cultural regeneration to discursive governance: Constructing the 
flagship of the ‘Museums quartier Vienna’ as a plural symbol of change, International Journal of 
 29 
Urban and Regional Research, 29(1), pp. 50-66. 
 
Evans, G. (2003) Hard branding the cultural city- From Prado to Prada. International Journal of 
Urban and Regional Research, 27(2), pp. 417-430. 
 
Failing, P. (1983) MOCA: Los Angeles gets its long-awaited Museum of Contemporary Art- or 
at least a Temporary Contemporary, ARTnews, pp. 105-109, October.  
 
Florida, R. (2002) The Rise of the Creative Class. (New York, Basic Books). 
 
Friedrich, K. (2002) The list; Downtown galleries, Downtown News, 25 February. Available at 
http://www.downtownnews.com/TopCo/02-25-02list.html. 
 
Frost-Kumpf, H. (1998) Cultural districts: The Arts as a strategy for revitalizing our cities, 
Washington, DC: Americans for the Arts. 
 
Gallery Row Organization. (2006) Retrieved 1 July 2006 from 
www.galleryrow.org/programs.htm. 
 
Gomez, M. (1998) Reflective Images: the case of urban regeneration in Glasgow and Bilbao, 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 22(1), pp. 106-121. 
 
Grodach, C. and Loukaitou-Sideris, A. (2007) Cultural development strategies and urban 
revitalization: A survey of US Cities, International Journal of Cultural Policy, 13(4), pp. 349 - 
370. 
 
Guasch, A.M. (2005) Global museums versus local artists: Paradoxes of identity between local 
and global understanding, in: A.M. Guasch and J. Zulaika (Eds.), Learning from the Bilbao 
Guggenheim, pp. 185-202 (Reno, NV, Center for Basque Studies, University of Nevada, Reno).  
 
Hamlin, J. (1999) Ansel Adams Center moving to larger space; Photography gallery, bookstore 
to open next year around corner from SFMOMA, San Francisco Chronicle, 29 September, pp. 
D2. 
 
_______. (2001). Rental reality; Softer market lures arts groups back to city, San Francisco 
Chronicle, 24 July, pp. A13 
 
Hamnett, C and Shoval, N. (2003) Museums as flagships of urban development, in: L. Hoffman, 
S. Fainstein, and D. Judd (Eds.), Cities and visitors: Regulating people, markets, and city space,  
pp. 219-236 (Malden, MA and Oxford, UK, Blackwell Publishing). 
 
Hartman, C. (2002) City for Sale: the transformation of San Francisco. Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press. 
 
Holo, S. (1999) Beyond the Prado. (Washington and London, Smithsonian Institution Press). 
 
 30 
Hymon, S. (2006) Urban pioneers in a battle usually fought in suburbs; Residents of gentrified 
downtown lofts don't want to live next to the LAPD’s new home, but a park as they expected, 
Los Angeles Times, 3 April, pp. B1. 
 
Jackson, M.-R. (2003) Investing in creativity: A study of the support structure for U.S. artists, 
The Journal of Arts Management, Law, and Society, 34(1), pp. 43-58. 
 
Kong, L. (2007) Cultural icons and urban development in Asia: Economic imperative, national 
identity, and global city status, Political Geography, 26, pp. 383-404. 
 
Lee, C. B. (2006) High profile projects and tourism policy in Birmingham, England: Do they 
work to enhance the city’s image and promote inward business investment? Planning Practice 
and Research, 21(3), pp. 367 - 381 
 
Lion, L. and Hernandez, C. (2006) The list; Downtown galleries, Downtown News, 2 October. 
Available at: http://www.downtownnews.com/TopCo/10-02-06list.html. 
 
Lorente, J. P. (2002) Urban cultural policy and urban regeneration: The special case of declining 
port cities in Liverpool, Marseilles, Bilbao, in: D. Crane, N. Kawashima, and K. Kawasaki 
(Eds.), Global culture: Media, arts, policy, and globalization, pp. 93-104. (New York, 
Routledge). 
 
Loukaitou-Sideris, A. and Sansbury, G. (1995/96) Lost Streets of Bunker Hill, California 
History, 74(4), pp. 394-407. 
 
Markusen, A and Schrock, G. (2006) The artistic dividend: Urban artistic specialisation and 
economic development implications, Urban Studies, 43(10), pp. 1661-1686. 
 
McCarthy, J. (2005) Cultural quarters and regeneration: The case of Wolverhampton, Planning 
Practice and Research, 20(3), pp. 297 - 311. 
 
McMillan, P. (1982) Stories of downtown L.A. Art colony exceed reality. Los Angeles Times, 29 
August, pp. D1. 
 
McNeil, D. (2000) McGuggenisation? National identity and globalization in the Basque county. 
Political Geography, 19(4), pp. 473-494. 
 
Miles, M. (2005) Interruptions: Testing the rhetoric of culturally-led urban development, Urban 
Studies, 42(5/6), pp. 889-911 
 
Miles, S. (2005) ‘Our Tyne’: Iconic regeneration and the revitalisation of identity in 
NewcastleGateshead, Urban Studies, 42(5/6), pp. 913-926. 
 
Montgomery, J. (2003) Cultural Quarters as Mechanisms for Urban Regeneration. Part 1: 
Conceptualising Cultural Quarters, Planning Practice & Research, 18(4), pp. 293-306. 
 
 31 
Museum of Contemporary Art. (2004) Financial statements as of and for the years ended June 
30, 2004 and 2003 and independent auditors’ report. Prepared by Deloitte & Touche. 
 
Newhouse, V. (1998) Towards a New Museum. (New York, Monacelli Press). 
 
Plaza, B. (2000) Evaluating the influence of a large cultural artifact in the attraction of tourism: 
the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao case. Urban Affairs Review 36(2), pp. 264-274 
 
______. (2006) The return on investment of the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao. International 
Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 30(2), pp. 452-467. 
 
Rodríguez, A., Martinez, R., and Guenaga, G. (2001) Uneven redevelopment: New urban 
policies and socio-spatial fragmentation in metropolitan Bilbao. European Urban and Regional 
Studies, 8(2), pp. 161–178. 
 
San Francisco Museum of Modern Art. (2004) Visitor Survey. 
 
San Francisco Redevelopment Agency (1979) Yerba Buena Center redevelopment plan. 17 
August. 
 
Sagalyn, L. (1997) Negotiating for public benefits: The bargaining calculus of public-private 
development. Urban Studies 34(12), pp.1955-1970. 
 
Scott, A. (2004) Cultural-products industries and urban economic development: prospects for 
growth and market contestation in global context, Urban Affairs Review, 39(4), pp. 461-490. 
 
Slesin, S. (1984) Downtown Los Angeles: The new settlers. The New York Times, 12 April, pp 
C1. 
 
Smyth, H. (1994) Marketing the city: The role of flagship developments in urban regeneration. 
(New York, Routledge). 
 
Solnit, R. and Schwartzenberg, S. (2000) Hollow City: Gentrification and the Eviction Of Urban 
Culture. (London, Verso). 
 
Sternberg, E. (2002) What makes buildings catalytic? How cultural facilities can be designed to 
spur surrounding development. Journal of Architectural and Planning Research, 19(1), pp. 30-
43. 
 
Strom, E. (1999) Let’s put on a show!: Performing arts and urban revitalization in Newark, New 
Jersey, Journal of Urban Affairs, 21(4), pp. 423–435. 
 
 
______. (2002) From pork to porcelain: Cultural institutions and downtown development, Urban 
Affairs Review, 38(1), pp. 3-21. 
 
 32 
Szanto, A. 2003. Hot and cool: Some contrasts between the visual art worlds of New York and 
Los Angeles, in: D. Halle (Ed), New York and Los Angeles: Politics, society, culture, (Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press). 
 
Terry, S. (1981) Los Angeles begins to shed image as cultural wasteland. Christian Science 
Monitor. 7 October. 
 
van Aalst, I. and Boogaarts, I. (2002) From museum to mass entertainment: The evolution of the 
role of museums in cities, European Urban and Regional Studies, 9(3), pp. 195-209. 
 
Vicario, L. and P. Martinez Monje. 2003. Another ‘Guggenheim effect’? The generation of a 
potentially gentrifiable neighbourhood in Bilbao. Urban Studies, 40(12), pp. 2383–2400. 
 
Whiting, S. (1996) Mission Street comeback South of Market artery's growth lures workers, 
tourists and culturally curious, San Francisco Chronicle, May, pp. D1, 3. 
 
Wilson, W. (1980) Downtown museum has the big 'M,' Los Angeles Times, pp. H2, 2 April. 
 
Yerba Buena Center for the Arts. (2004a). Attendance Report. 
 
______. (2004b) Report on audits of financial statements for the years ended June 30, 2004 and 
2003.  Prepared by Burr, Pilger and Mayer. 
 
______. (2006) Mission statement, retrieved 6 May, 2005 from www.ybca.org. 
 
Zukin, S (1995) The Cultures of Cities. (Malden, Mass and Oxford, UK, Blackwell Publishing). 
 
Interviews Cited 
Bakar, Gerson, Board Member, SFMOMA, 2 June 2005 (telephone). 
 
Clark, Erica, former Director of Development, Museum of Contemporary Art, Pasadena, 15 
March 2005. 
 
Cosgrove, Don, former Administrator, Community Redevelopment Agency, Pasadena, 24 
February 2005 
 
Green, Bert, Bert Green Fine Art and Gallery Row Member, Los Angeles, 2 March 2005 
 
Helfeld, Edward, former Director, Community Redevelopment Agency, 9 March 2005 
(telephone). 
 
Hammond, Ayahlushim, former Bunker Hill Project Administer, Community Redevelopment 
Agency, Los Angeles, 16 March 2005. 
Keating, Tim, President, Los Angeles River Artists and Business Association (LARABA), Los 
Angeles, 4 March 2005. 
 
 33 
Killacky, John, former Director, YBCA, San Francisco, 25 May 2005 
 
Koshalek, Richard, former Director, MOCA, Pasadena, 15 March 2005. 
 
Lane, Jack, former Director, SFMOMA, 5 May 2005 (telephone). 
 
Murphy, Randy, Director of Administration and Operations, MOCA, 18 February 2005. 
 
Pickering, Catherine, Assistant Project Manager, Yerba Buena Center, San Francisco, 25 May, 
2005. 
 
Pritikin, Rennie, former curator, YBCA, 26 April 2005 (telephone). 
 
Ross, David, former Director, SFMOMA, 4 May 2005 and 10 May 2005 (telephone). 
 
Sause, Helen, former YBC Project Director and San Francisco Redevelopment Agency Director, 
San Francisco, 25 May 2005 
 
Smith, Mary Beth, Director of Marketing and Communications, YBCA, San Francisco, 25 May 
2005 
 
Spivack, Don, Deputy Administrator, Community Redevelopment Agency, Los Angeles 22 
February 2005. 
 
Togonon, Julina, Togonon Gallery, 23 June 2005 (telephone). 
 























































         
 





















Figure 6: Map of Downtown and South of Market Cultural Facilities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
